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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the understanding of empirically-oriented work on the size of 
government by integrating the analysis of three basic elements: (i) the 'demand' for govern-
ment stemming in part from attempts to coercively redistribute, often analyzed in a median 
voter framework; (ii) the 'supply' of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other 
models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of 'political influence' when influence and 
economic interests are distinct.  
 
The role of the first two factors have been considered in recent empirical studies of govern-
ment growth by Ferris and West (1996) and Kau and Rubin (2002). Estimates of the effect of 
unequal political influence on the size of government have been provided by Mueller and 
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1. Introduction  
 
A systematic account of the size of government in democratic countries will consider at least 
three basic elements. First, there is the 'demand' for government, stemming from attempts 
to use the fiscal system to coercively redistribute as well as from the ordinary demand for 
public services. Second, it is necessary to investigate the role of the 'supply' of activities 
on which taxation may be levied. A third key factor is the distribution and role of political 
influence, as distinct from the economic interests of individual voters.  
 
The first two of these elements have recently been considered in empirical studies of the 
growth of government by Ferris and West (1996) and Kau and Rubin (2002). Estimates of 
the effect of unequal political influence on the size of government have recently been 
made by Mueller and Stratmann (2003)1. In this paper, we combine all three elements in a 
spatial voting model where complex policy platforms reflect a politically motivated 
balancing of the economic interests of heterogeneous citizens. 
 
Our purpose is twofold: first, to contribute towards a more complete political economy of 
the size and growth of government; and second, to use the integrative model as a basis for 
further insight into selected results in the empirical literature.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews selectively recent literature on the size of 
government in the light of the demand-supply-collective choice framework, and 
acknowledges other important issues and factors determining the size of government that are 
not studied here. Section 3 presents the model. Briefly, the building blocks of the model are 
as follows: 'Demand' for government originates from voters with unequal incomes and 
unequal political powers who demand public goods and who also attempt to use the fiscal 
system to coercively redistribute in their favour. The supply of taxable activities originates 
with voters who pay taxes on their market activities only, and who also engage in valuable 
non-market actions. Thus, in addition to the deadweight loss from taxation and its 
implications for the welfare of voters, political parties take into account the fact that tax 
                                                          
1
 The Mueller and Stratmann paper also allows to some extent for supply and demand though it does 
not emphasize the role of these factors. Our discussion of this paper assumes that participation in 
elections is closely related to political influence. See also the work of Bassett, Burkett and Putterman 
(1999), who identify income with influence in different ways, and consider the effect of influence so 
defined on transfer payments. 
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revenues vary with the choices that individuals make between market and non-market 
activities. The equilibrium of a competitive political process is modelled using a probabilistic 
spatial voting framework in which the influence and interests of voters are heterogeneous, 
and no single voter or group of voters is decisive. 
  
Section 4 analyses the comparative static properties of the integrative model concerning the 
size of government, and uses these results to comment on selected aspects of the empirical 
literature. (The progressivity of the equilibrium tax system is examined in an Appendix). 
Section 5 provides a further sense of how the integrative model differs from its analytical 
and empirical predecessors by contrasting the determinants of government size in the 
model with comparable median voter and Leviathan frameworks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A Selective Review of Literature 
 
Early work on the 'demand' for government, following Wagner (1958), Peacock and 
Wiseman (1967), Bird (1970) and others, emphasizes the role of factors such as income,  
urbanization, and wars determining the ordinary or traditional demand for commodities 
provided through the public sector. This voluminous literature is primarily empirical in 
nature, and interesting contributions continue to appear. We return to this work below. 
  
Following the seminal contributions of Stigler (1971), Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), much of the theoretical and empirical research on the 'demand' 
for government shifted to a concern with the role of income inequality in shaping the way in 
which the fiscal system is used to coercively redistribute under majority rule. If preferences 
are single-peaked and the issue space is uni-dimensional, the median voter (usually assumed 
to have median income) emerges as the Condorcet winner. The median voter thus sets the 
tax rate, the size of public expenditure, and hence the amount of redistribution. In this 
framework, the size of government and the extent of redistribution are limited only by 
behavioural responses to taxation. With the distribution of income skewed to the right, an 
increase in the ratio of mean to median income in this framework leads to expansion of the 
public sector, a result confirmed empirically by Meltzer and Richard (1983), following 
earlier work in the same median voter tradition by Bergstrom and Goodman (1977) and 
Borcherding and Deacon (1977). Expansion of the franchise down the income scale has the 
same effect, as shown in studies by Husted and Kenny (1997) and Lott and Kenny (1999).  
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In contrast to the median voter literature on coercive redistribution, the work of Baumol 
(1967, 1993), Brennan and Buchanan (1980), and Kau and Rubin (1981) focuses on the 
supply side, while ignoring or downplaying the limits to coercive redistribution posed by the 
existence of competition for political support from voters who do not like to pay taxes. 
Several empirical studies of the size of government or of tax structure since, including Ferris 
and West (1996), Becker and Mulligan (1998), Kenny and Winer (2002) and Kau and Rubin 
(2002) have investigated the role of the capacity to raise tax revenue as a factor determining 
the size or structure of the public sector. As a group, these studies appear to indicate that the 
availability of tax revenue, and hence the size of government, varies with the structure of the 
economy, including for example, the extent of oil reserves and female labour force 
participation. Expansion of potential tax bases allows reductions in the full economic cost of 
raising a given amount of revenue, and also attenuates political opposition by reducing tax 
burdens relative to the costs of political organization2. Kau and Rubin (2002), for example, 
suggest that the major determinant of the growth of government spending in the United 
States since 1930 is the increased participation of women in the labour force (where they can 
be taxed), accounting for about 60% of the total change in government revenue.    
 
Most of the studies of coercive redistribution and of the role of supply, as well as many 
others in the tradition initiated by Wagner and Peacock and Wiseman, including Ram 
(1987), Gemmel (1990), Tridimas (1992), Kristov and Lindert (1992), Courakis, Moura-
Roque, and Tridimas (1993), and Borcherding, Ferris and Garzoni (2001), also provide 
mixed evidence concerning the longest standing theory of government growth - Wagner's 
Law: that the income elasticity of the demand for government is greater than one. A large 
number of differing estimates of the income elasticity of demand for government have 
appeared over the years, and this mixed evidence continues to accumulate.3 
 
The role of the distribution of political influence, the third of the factors we emphasize in 
this paper, has only recently been the focus of empirical research. The work on the 
extension of the franchise cited above is obviously relevant here. Even more recently, 
using cross-country data Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999) consider the relationship 
between income shares and transfer payments in a cross section of countries. They 
assume that political influence and income is positively correlated in various ways. 
                                                          
2
 Of course political opposition is not of concern to a Leviathan. It does play a role in other models of 
tax structure such as Kenny and Winer (2002).  
3
 The literature on Wagner's  law is far too large to cover even in a perfunctory manner here. For 
further discussion, see the surveys of work on growth of government by Holsey and Borcherding 
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Perhaps the most robust conclusion is that their results are consistent with an influence 
type theory rather than the simple median voter theory4. Mueller and Stratmann (2003) 
hypothesize that more political participation (implying that poorer voters take a more 
active interest in politics), leads to more redistribution and to a larger public sector. Their 
results, based on pooled cross-national, time series evidence, show that in countries with 
well-entrenched democratic institutions, this is indeed the case. However, in weak 
democracies, greater participation does not lead to bigger government, implying that 
politically privileged groups can block redistributive policies.   
 
Most of this interesting empirical work is based on analytical frameworks that, in our 
view, are incomplete in the following sense. Work on the 'supply' side has, on our 
reading, downplayed the role of the demand for coercive redistribution, while the 
literature on coercive redistribution has been notably constrained by the assumption that the 
fiscal system is essentially uni-dimensional (or that one of two instruments is determined by 
the government budget constraint), so that the median voter theorem can be applied.5 
Moreover, as in all median voter models, there is no real distinction between the economic 
interests and the political influence of various voters, since one voter is politically decisive. 
This is a serious drawback, since economic interests and political influence can evolve in 
different ways for various reasons (as discussed, for example, in Downs 1957). The work 
of Hinich (1977), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981), Hinich and Munger (1997), Hettich and 
Winer (1999), Hotte and Winer (2001), Tridimas (2001) and others using the probabilistic 
spatial voting model relaxes both these conditions. But the details of coercive redistribution 
and its relation to the size of government have usually been suppressed in such models in the 
pursuit of other matters. Finally, one may note that despite its success in moving toward a 
broader perspective, the recent empirical work on the role of political participation is not 
founded on a well-explored analytical model that includes all of the three basic elements 
emphasized here.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
(1997), Peacock and Scott (2000) and Mueller (2003, chapter 21). 
4
 See especially , Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999, p. 216) 
5
 Extension of the median voter model to deal with more than two fiscal instruments is possible. 
Establishing existence of an equilibrium in such cases requires either that further restrictions be placed on 
the nature of voter preferences (see Roberts 1977, Meltzer and Richard 1981, and Gans and Smart 1996), 
or it must be assumed that each fiscal parameter is decided by majority rule in a separate 'committee' of a 
legislature or in a separate election in which the median voter is decisive (as in Meltzer and Richard 1985).  
The restriction on preferences is related to the Mirrlees-Spence single crossing property, so that 
incomes and abilities of all voters are monotonically related. The application of this kind of restriction 
to allow another dimension of policy in the median voter model is reviewed in Boadway and Keen 
(2000). It appears that such restrictions cannot be used to allow a median or decisive voter model to 
extend to the analysis of complex fiscal systems. 
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There are other important determinants of the size of government besides those 
acknowledged above, including the specific institutions which set the terms within which the 
political contest occurs. Three such arrangements have recently attracted attention. First, the 
formal electoral rule, that is, whether a majoritarian (first-past-the-post) or a proportional 
representation electoral rule applies (for example, Milesi-Ferreti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002, 
Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2000, Austen-Smith 2000, and Persson and Tabellini 1999).  
Second, the structure of executive – legislative relations for policy making; that is, whether 
government taxing and spending decisions are made in a presidential regime characterised 
by separation of powers, or a parliamentary regime characterised by its dependence on a 
confidence vote (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini 1999, and Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini 2000).  A third branch of the literature that explores the importance of governance 
for the size of government focuses on the results of legislative bargains intended to limit the 
uncertainties associated with distributive politics under majority rule (for example, to list just 
two studies among many, Shepsle, Weingast and Johnson 1981, and Baqir 2002).  
 
In this paper, we focus on analytical and empirical implications of the interaction of 
'demand', 'supply' and 'political influence' in a spatial voting framework. This mixture of 
analytical elements and of theoretical and empirical work proves to be sufficiently complex 
on its own, and we leave the incorporation of other or detailed aspects of governance for 
further research.  
 
3. Analytical Framework 
 
We suppose that individuals vote and make choices regarding market and non-market 
activity in two interrelated stages. In the first, every individual participates in a political 
process that results in the level of a pure public good and tax rates for every person in the 
polity. In a second stage, each household takes the fiscal system as given, and chooses 
among work (market goods), leisure and home production. Decisions at both stages must be 
consistent with each other in the political equilibrium. This two stage analysis, which is 
common in the literature, allows us to analyze private and collective choice before 
combining them to determine the overall political - economic equilibrium. We begin with 
the second stage.   
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3.1 The individual voter/home-producer 
 
Each person i, who is a voter, a taxpayer and a home-producer, is assumed to maximise a  
quasi-linear utility function defined over a private consumption good Zi, leisure Li and a 
publicly provided good G: 
 
Ui    =  Zi + βlnLi + γlnG                (1) 
 
To account for the possibility of shifts in the taxable capacity of the economy originating 
from changes in home production (or from informal labour employment), as suggested by 
Kau and Rubin (1981, 2002), we divide labour supply into two components; formal work in 
the market place, denoted as a fraction of the day by Ni, which yields an income subject to 
taxation; and informal work for home production, denoted as fraction of the day by Hi, 
which is left untaxed. The time endowment constraint requires that 
 
Ni + Hi + Li    =   1          (2) 
 
Private consumption goods and services Zi can either be bought in the market or produced at 
home. Let Q be the quantity bought in the market at a price P. Home production takes place 
by using time as the only input under a logarithmic technology. Formally, home production 
is αlnH, where α is a positive coefficient measuring household productivity. Writing Zi = Qi 
+ αlnHi and using (1), the utility function for person i can be written: 
 
Ui  =  Qi + αlnHi + βlnLi + γlnG.                    (1') 
 
The parameters of utility functions are assumed to be identical for all individuals. Voters do, 
however, differ in their productivities and, thus, incomes6. Denoting the wage rate of voter i 
by Wi, his or her income is Yi = WiNi. Assuming that each voter- home-producer pays an 
income tax rate ti the budget constraint is written as 
 
                                                          
6
 Hence in this formulation, when political influence is uniformly distributed, differences in income are 
politically the most salient characteristic. Generalizing the model to allow for distributions of tastes 
very substantially complicates the framework, and we must leave such generalizations of the present 
model for further research. For an initial attempt to deal with such distributions when political 
influence and economic interests are essentially coincident, see Usher (1977).  
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PQi  = (1-ti)Wi(1-Li-Hi).                     (3) 
 
The assumption that each voter faces a tax at rate ti is intended as a metaphor for actual 
tax systems. Actual tax structures differentiate in many ways among taxpayers by 
appropriate use of a multi-dimensional skeleton that includes multiple tax bases, separate 
rate structures for each base, and many special provisions such as deductions and 
exemptions which selectively alter the definition of bases and rate structures for particular 
groups. Hettich and Winer (1999) show how this full tax skeleton will emerge in a model 
of the kind used here when there are various administration costs that place a wedge 
between tax revenues collected and public services delivered. The present formulation 
captures this differentiation in a simple manner, by assuming there is one (distortionary, 
proportional) tax rate that can be directed towards each taxpayer. To incorporate fully the 
complete tax skeleton in the present context would complicate the model substantially, 
and this task is left for further research.  
 
Maximizing the utility function (1') subject to (3) yields individual demand functions for 
market purchases, home production and leisure respectively:        
      
Qi = [(1-ti)Wi -(α+β)P]/P,   Hi = αP/(1-ti)Wi    and   Li = βP/(1-ti)Wi. 
 
Household income and the indirect utility function can then be written respectively as:  
 
Yi    =  Wi  - [(α+β)P/(1-ti)]        (4a) 
Vi   =  [(1-ti)Wi /P] - (α+β) + (α+β)lnP + αlnα + βlnβ - (α+β)ln(1-ti)Wi + γlnG  (4b) 
 
For later use, we note that on differentiating the latter two equations with respect to tax rates 
and the level of public provision, we have that: 
 
∂Yi /∂dti  =     - (α+β)P/(1-ti)2     and ∂Vi /∂ti   =  -Yi /P    (4c)   
∂Yi /∂G  =   0             and ∂Vi /∂G  =  γ/G     (4d) 
 
From the above expression for Yi , we see that for Wi ≤ W0 ≡ (α+β)P/(1-ti), the household 
does not work and, therefore, Yi=0. Note that as ti rises so does W0. Individuals with earning 
ability below or equal to W0 will not make any market purchases (Qi=0) and rely on home 
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production only for their consumption. For ease of exposition in what follows, we assume 
that Yi > 0 for all taxpayers i, i=1,2,…,I  although for some, income may be very low.  
 
3.2 Collective choice  
 
Voting behaviour by each of I citizens is assumed to be probabilistic from the viewpoint 
of the political parties.7 Each of two political parties chooses the levels of policy 
instruments which are expected to maximize its expected political support (its expected 
vote or expected plurality), given the probability densities fi describing the voting 
behaviour of each individual (assumed to be common knowledge to the parties), and 
subject to the response of voters to the fiscal system, the budget constraint of the 
government and the anticipated policy proposal of the other party contesting the election.  
 
Let fi depend only on the difference in utilities that would result from the adoption of the 
proposals of the incumbent party (1) and the opposition (0), and be continuous and twice 
differentiable. Then the probability Πi that voter i votes for the incumbent is given by the 
continuous function 
 
Πi  =  fi[Vi1 – Vi0]          (5) 
 
where ViJ, J=1,0, denotes the utility that voter i expects to derive when party J implements 
its platform. The expected total vote for the incumbent is EV1 = ∑iΠi = ∑ifi[Vi1 – Vi0], 
while for the opposition it is EV0 = I-EV1, where I is the total number of voters. 
 
The budget constraint of the government requires that public expenditure equal revenue 
from taxation. Each taxpayer is assumed to pay an income tax at a proportional rate ti. It is 
also assumed that the government is able to discriminate perfectly among different tax 
payers. (The latter assumption is dictated by mathematical necessity rather than choice, 
since including a self-selection constraint in the present framework introduces intractable 
polynomials in what follows).  
 
Denoting the unit cost of producing the public good by C, the budget constraint of the 
government is:  
                                                          
7
 Another assumption about uncertainty is that it applies at the aggregate level, to knowledge by parties 
about the distribution of the total vote for each party. See Roemer (2001).  
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CG  =  ∑i ti Yi, i=1,...,I .        (6) 
 
Given the policy proposals of the opposition, the incumbent party maximizes expected 
votes EV1 subject to (6) which yields the following first order conditions for ti and G, 
where µ denotes the relevant Lagrange multiplier: 
 
(∂fi/∂Vi) (∂Vi/∂ti)  =   µ [Yi+ti(∂Yi/∂ti)]           I equations                                              (7.1) 
∑i(∂fi/∂Vi) (∂Vi/∂G)  =  µC                  (7.2) 
 
Analogously for the opposition party. Note that in deriving (7.2) it is assumed that the 
public good does not affect the level of income.  
 
A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, {[t11,…,tI1,G1],[t10,…,tI0,G0]}, defined by the first 
order-conditions for each party exists if the expected-vote function for each party is 
continuous on the space of all policies and quasi-concave in its own policy instruments 
for each given choice of instruments by the other party. We assume this to be the case.  
 
Since the indirect utility function Vi above is concave in each ti and in G 8, concavity of 
the expected vote function is assured if the concavity of density fi depends essentially on 
the concavity of Vi. Such would be the case, for example, if Vi = [a non-random (con-
cave) component of utility + a random component independent of policy choices], with 
the random element being uniformly distributed, as for example in Coughlin, Mueller and 
Murrell (1990 a, b). The random element might represent a party's beliefs about how 
voters assess their credibility and the non-policy characteristics of its candidates. 
 
Since voting depends only on the difference in utilities, the platforms of the parties will 
be identical in the Nash equilibrium if the expected vote functions are strictly concave in 
own policy choices. For convenience we make this stronger assumption as well. Party 
platforms then must converge in the equilibrium (see Enelow and Hinich 1989 for proof, 
and for further discussion of the concavity issue), and we may drop the subscript denoting 
party. Alternatively, we may note that since EV0 = I-EV1, the first order conditions for the 
opposition are essentially the same as those for the incumbent, since we have assumed 
common knowledge of voting densities, and hence both parties will choose the same, 
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politically optimal policies in the Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
3.3 Electoral equilibrium 
 
Following Coughlin and Nitzan (1981) and Hettich and Winer (1999), the political 
equilibrium outlined above can be conveniently represented as the solution to the problem 
of choosing policy instruments to optimise a synthetic political support function  
 
S  = ∑iθiVi                             (8) 
 
subject to the same budget constraint that faces each political party, where θi ≡ θi′/∑iθi′ 
and the θi′ = ∂fi/∂Vi  measure the sensitivity of the probability that voter h will vote for 
the proposed policy at the Nash equilibrium. Note that ∑iθi=1, so that⎯θ =1/I.  
 
The intuition for this representation theorem is straightforward (see Coughlin 1992 or 
Hettich and Winer 1999 for proofs): Voters care about their economic welfare. Thus if a 
party can find a Pareto-improving platform it will advance its electoral chances of success 
by adopting it. Competition forces the parties to seek out such policies, and in an 
equilibrium no such platforms remain to be found.9 
 
It should be noted that this does not mean that all voters will be treated alike (hence the 
weighted sum of utilities in S). In moving towards the Pareto frontier, parties find it 
advantageous to give special attention to the demands of voters who are relatively 
politically sensitive (whose θi′ is relatively high).  
 
Using the representation theorem, the first order conditions (7.1) and (7.2) at a Nash 
equilibrium can be written as 
 
θi(∂Vi /∂ti) ÷ [ ∂(tiYi )/∂ti] = µ      for each i = 1,2,...,I   
                                                                                                                                                                      
8
  Note that ∂2Vi/ti2 = -(α+β)/(1-ti)2 < 0 and ∂2Vi/G2 = - γ/G2 < 0. 
9
 The support function S is not a social welfare function: Its linear form and the weights in it are 
determined within the model, and not on the basis of some exogenous social goal or norm. It should 
also be noted that the efficiency of equilibrium can be relaxed by introducing various kinds of decision 
externalities. (See for example, Hettich and Winer 1999, chapter 6). We do not consider the implica-
tions of this for the size of government here. 
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∑iθi(∂Vi /∂Gi) ÷ C = µ       i = 1,2,...,I 
 
These conditions replicate the first order conditions for each party at a Nash equilibrium. 
The former represents the marginal political cost (or loss in votes) per dollar of tax 
revenue raised from each taxpayer. The latter represents the marginal political benefit (or 
gain in votes) per dollar of public expenditure. In a political equilibrium, the marginal 
political loss will be the same across all taxpayers and equal to the marginal political 
benefit.  
 
Using the indirect utility function (4b) and the derivatives (4c) and 4(d), the above 
conditions become: 
 
θiYi /P =  µ [Yi-P(α+β)(ti/(1-ti)2)] I equations               (9.1) 
∑i θi γ   =  µC                    (9.2) 
 
After rearranging as a quadratic equation, (9.1) becomes (θi-µP)Yi ti2-[(2Yi(θi-µP)-
µ(α+β)P2)] ti+(θi-µP)Yi = 0 or, more compactly, Αti2-[(2A-B)]ti+A = 0. The solution for ti 
is:  
 
ti =  {(2A-B)±√[(2A-B)2-4A2]}÷(2A) = {(2A-B)±√[B2-4AB]}÷(2A) ⇒ 
ti =  {(2A-B)±B√[1-4(A/B)]}÷(2A). 
 
Using the approximation √(1+px+qx2) ≈ 1+(p/2)x+(1/2)[q-(p2/4)]x2, with p = -4, x = A/B 
and q = 0, we obtain  ti ≈ {(2A-B)±[B-2A-(2A2/B]}÷(2A), which yields the roots  
ti1 = (µP-θi)Yi/µ(α+β)P2    and   ti2 = 2-[µ(α+β)P2/(θi-µP)Yi]+[(θi-µP)Yi/µ(α+β)P2] 10 
 
Before proceeding we check whether a unique economic solution can be obtained. 
Assuming that 0<ti1<1, ti2 can be a second acceptable solution if also 0<ti2<1. Noting that 
ti2=2+(1/ti1)-ti1, or equivalently, ti2=-(ti12-2ti1-1)/ti1, after the relevant manipulations we 
obtain that for ti2>0 it must  be 0<ti1<1, and that when ti2<1, it must be that 
ti1>(1+√5)÷2>1. We can then be certain that when 0<ti1<1, ti2 is not an acceptable root. 
Therefore in what follows we focus on ti1.  
 
                                                          
10
 A similar problem of dealing with two roots arises in the work of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and 
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Noting that ∑iθi=1, using the budget constraint (6) and substituting in (9.2) we have that  
µ = γ/∑itiYi. Inserting ti1 from the above in this and solving for µ we have that µ  =  
[(α+β)P2γ+∑iθiYi2]/P∑iYi2  . 
 
To solve for ti1 and G, we then substitute into the expression for ti1, and then use (6) to 
solve for G. Denoting σ2θY ≡ covariance(θi,Yi2), σ2Y ≡ variance(Yi) and⎯Y ≡ ∑iYi/I (the 
mean value of Yi), and noting that ∑iθiYi2 = (I σ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2) and  ∑iYi2 = I(σ2Y +⎯Y2), 
we have that: 
 
   (α+β)γP2 + I σ2θY + (σ2Y +⎯Y2)I(⎯θ-θi)        Yi 
  t*i    =    ________________________________________________      __________    (10)  
       (α+β)γP2 + I σ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2        (α+β)P      
 
     γ
 
I (σ2Y +⎯Y2)          P 
 G*    =    ____________________________________         _____     (11) 
    (α+β)γP2 + I σ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2         C 
 
In the equilibrium, tax rates depend on: the size and distribution of income, represented 
respectively by⎯Y and σ2Y; the number of voters taxpayers I; consumer tastes for leisure  
β (and therefore indirectly for private goods) and for the public good γ; household 
productivity in home production α; the political influence of the voter in comparison to 
the mean political influence,⎯θ-θi ;  the distribution of political influence in relation to the 
distribution of income, captured by
 
σ2θY; and the price of private consumption P.  
 
The provision of the public good G also depends on the same set of factors except for the 
political weights by themselves θi. Given the structure of our model, where G is jointly 
and uniformly consumed by all voters and utility is separable in G, the political weights θi 
do not affect the equilibrium level of public expenditure by themselves - only their 
covariance with income, σ2θY, does.  In what follows special attention is given to the role 
of the covariance of influence and income which, as we shall see, does not enter the 
median voter analogue to the present model.  
  
It is interesting to note that in the optimal tax literature, the analogue of σ2θY is referred to 
as the covariance of the “social valuation of income” and taxpayer income, and is 
determined by social justice criteria. In the present setting, σ2θY reflects how voter income 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Cukierman and Meltzer (1991). 
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and political influence vary in relation to each other, and is determined within the model 
by voting densities and the factors determining the distribution of income. We are aware 
that in a more complex model, this covariance may depend on a variety of institutional 
and political factors.  
 
4.  The Relative Size of Government and Implications of the Integrative Model  
for Empirical Research  
 
The relative size of the public sector in the integrative model may be defined as s  ≡  CG ⁄ 
I⎯Y  = (1/I)(G /⎯y)(C/P)   where⎯y is average real income, which upon substituting from 
(11) and rearranging gives: 
 
                            γP(σ2Y +⎯Y2) 
s*  =   ____________________________________________                                                (12) 
 [(α+β)γP2 + I σ2θY + σ2Y+⎯Y2]⎯Y 
 
Here the main determinants of s* are: consumer tastes; consumer productivity in home 
production; mean income; income inequality (captured by the variance of the distribution 
of income, σ2Y); and political inequality in relation to income inequality (captured by the 
covariance, σ2θY).  
 
4.1 Comparative statics and empirical work 
 
We proceed to investigate the comparative static properties of (12), both as a way of 
understanding the model and as a basis for drawing out implications of the model for 
empirical work. Further understanding of the integrative model is provided in the next 
section by contrasting the solution for the relative size of government in (12) with that in 
comparable median voter and Leviathan frameworks.  
 
Differentiating (12) with respect to mean income, we have that:  
 
1. Sign  (∂s* ⁄ ∂⎯Y)  =  Sign { [P2γ (α+β) + Iσ2θY)](⎯Y2 - σ2Y) - (σ2Y +⎯Y2)2} =  ?  
 
In the present framework, the effect of an increase in mean income on the size of 
government is ambiguous: it depends on the relative strength of the taste, inequality and 
income factors identified here. This result stands in contrast to Wagner’s law of increas-
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ing state activity: that as per capita income increases, the share of public expenditure in 
income increases too.  
 
The complexity of this comparative statics result offers a possible explanation of the wide 
variety of often conflicting income elasticity estimates which have been reported in the 
empirical literature. It is possible that some of the variation arises from the failure to, or 
difficulties of controlling for all of the factors that determine the effect of changes in 
average income and that play a role in determining the size of government in the present, 
more general, setting.   
 
2. Sign (∂s*⁄ ∂α)  =  Sign { −γP2s*  ⁄  [(α+β)γP2 + I σ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2)]} < 0 
 
The less productive the household in home production, the larger the relative size of 
government. This result provides a formalization of the 'supply side' explanation of 
government growth, proposed in empirical studies by Kau and Rubin (1981, 2002). 
Technological progress in the formal market sector, which can be interpreted as a fall in 
α, causes household labour supply in the informal sector to fall and labour supply in the 
formal sector to increase. This in turn increases tax revenue and reduces the excess 
burden of taxation; as a result the income tax base available to finance public expenditure 
increases.  
 
3. Sign (∂s*⁄ ∂β)  = Sign { −γP2s* ⁄  [(α+β)γP2 + Iσ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2)]} < 0 
 
That is, the stronger the preference for leisure, the smaller the relative size of govern-
ment. The effect is exactly the same as that when α changes, and for the same reason. 
Thus if one estimates a non-linear regression equation based on (12), it will not be 
possible to distinguish whether the parameter on P2 reflects the technological coefficient 
by which households “transform” time into output α, οr the preference for leisure β. This 
raises the question of exactly what is captured in empirical studies, such as that of Kau 
and Rubin, which show that growth of government is strongly related to entry of women 
into the labour force.  
 
 
4. Sign  (∂s*⁄ ∂γ) = Sign {Iσ2θY  + σY2 +⎯Y2 } > 0 
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The stronger the preferences for the public good, the larger the relative size of govern-
ment, since Iσ2θY+σ2Y+⎯Y2  = ∑i θiYi2  > 0. Hence an increase in the intensity of the taste 
for the public good will unequivocally increase the relative size of the public sector, a 
result which accords well with the intuition of demand theory. 
 
5. Sign (∂s*⁄ ∂P) = Sign {Iσ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2 - (α+β)γP2 )} =  ? 
 
This result bears on Baumol's (1967, 1993) productivity effect and empirical work that 
has attempted to investigate its strength. Whether a decrease in the relative price of 
private consumption, as might follow productivity advance in the private sector that is 
faster than in the public sector, increases the relative size of government is ambiguous, 
and depends on the strength of political inequality, the variance of income, mean income, 
the strength of preferences for private and public goods and the productivity of home 
production.  
 
It should be noted that the way the productivity effect is captured here differs from the 
standard approach in the literature. Studies of government expenditure growth typically 
specify an equation of the form lnG = c0 + ePlnPG + eYlnY +... (e.g. Borcherding 1985, 
Mueller 2003). If the price of public services PG rises (equivalently, P in our model falls) 
and demand is price inelastic (-1< eP < 0), then public expenditure grows in relative 
terms. If growth in income is also taken into account the relative size of government 
output will increase when the income elasticity exceeds the absolute value of the price 
elasticity of demand for G 11.  
 
From equation (11) above, the equilibrium price elasticity of G is -1, which is the result of 
the log-linearity of the utility function, so the productivity effect, if it leads to a larger 
public sector, cannot work through this elasticity in the present model. Comparative 
statics result 5 postulates a more complicated relationship between the relative size of 
                                                          
11
 Assume that labour is the only input into both the private and the public sector and that labour 
productivity in the private sector rises by r while it does not rise at all in the public sector (that is, Qt = ertLQt 
and Gt = LGt, where e=the basis of natural logs and t=time). With W = W0ert, we have that PG = WLGt/Gt = 
W0ert, which rises through time at the rate r, while the price of Q remains constant. Similarly, real income Q 
+ PGG = ertLQt+ertLGt rises at the rate r. From lnG = c0 + ePlnPG + eYlnY we have that the rate of growth of 
G is dlnG = (dG/G) = eP(dPG/PG) + eY(dY/Y). Hence, dG/G = (eP + eY) r  which is greater, smaller or equal 
to zero as the absolute value of eY is greater, smaller or equal to eP. That is, if the income elasticity of 
demand for government sector output exceeds the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand for 
government output, the rate of growth of government output exceeds the rate of growth of income and, 
consequently, the relative size of government will be increasing as the economy grows.   
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public expenditure and the productivity lag than that described in standard demand 
specifications. One may note that the ambiguity of the effect of a change in the price of 
public consumption on the size of government has been acknowledged before in the 
literature. Kenny (1978) shows that whether an increase in income will increase the growth 
of public consumption, depends on the strength of the income elasticity of demand and the 
elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption. However in his model, the 
increase in the price of public consumption is attributed to an increasing voter income only, 
rather than the broader set of changes in technology and costs identified here, which may 
occur independently of changes in income. Again, as for work on Wagner's Law, and in 
view of the difficulties of controlling for all of the factors that determine the effect of 
changes in relative prices, it is not surprising that empirical estimates will vary from study 
to study. 
 
6. Sign  (∂s*⁄ ∂σ2Y)   =  Sign {(α+β)γP2 + Iσ2θY }  =   ? 
 
Whether a mean preserving increase in income inequality increases the relative size of 
government depends on the relative strength of preferences and productivity in home 
production and on the covariance of political influence and income. 
 
With σ2θY ≥ 0, so that influence is distributed in a pro-rich manner, ∂s/∂σ2Y > 0. A related 
analytical result - which, however, omits the role of σ2θY - is found by Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1991) using a median voter model with a tax schedule that is quadratic (T = - 
r+tY+aY2), and where all taxpayers face the same tax and transfer parameters. Both here 
and in the earlier model, this result occurs because the structure of the equilibrium tax 
structure is such that as the variance of income increases, the government gets more taxes 
from the rich than it loses from the poor following a mean preserving increase in income 
inequality. (This interpretation is supported by the comparison of models in section 5). 
 
For values of the covariance such that σ2θY < - (α+β)γP2 /I, then (∂s*⁄ ∂σ2Y) < 0. In this 
case, politically influential and now poorer voters use their influence to insure that the 
public sector does not divert income away from their consumption of desired privately 
supplied goods. Accordingly, as the condition above indicates, the stronger the taste for 
public goods (γ), the more pro-poor must the distribution of influence be for this 
particular result to hold.  
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Cross-national regressions of the effect of inequality on size of government (see, for 
example, the simple regression in Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003) for a sample of OECD 
countries) show that more inequality, as measured by the pre-tax income GINI coeffi-
cient, is associated with smaller government.12 (Here one immediately thinks of the 
United States which has a relatively high GINI and also a relatively small s). The sign of 
the coefficient on the income GINI could be a reflection of the comparative static result 
for σ2Y with sufficiently small σ2θY. This explanation requires that all or most countries in 
the sample have similar pro-poor distributions of influence. A quite different, and perhaps 
more likely, explanation for the regression result is that countries with more unequal 
income distributions also have more pro-rich distributions of political influence. In this 
case, the income GINI in a cross-section of countries may just be a proxy for the role of 
the covariance of income and influence, which is discussed immediately below. 
  
7. Sign  (∂s*⁄ ∂|σ2θY| )  =   Sign { −γP(σ2Y+⎯Y2) }  <  0 
 
The more unequal the distribution of political influence in relation to the distribution of 
income, the higher the relative size of government. This effect is stronger the greater is 
the variance of incomes because of the interaction of income inequality, tax structure and 
government size reflected in result 6. The role of the covariance of influence and income 
is not at all surprising, but it cannot be revealed in a median voter framework, where one 
voter is politically decisive, and it is useful to remember this when studying growth in 
government in situations where political influence is skewed or where its distribution is 
changing. 
 
For example, let us compare two states. In the first state there is complete political 
equality, so that the distribution of political power is independent of the distribution of 
income and hence σ2θY  = 0. In the second the political arrangements have redistributed 
power in favour of the lower income groups, so that σ2θY  < 0. Our model predicts that the 
latter state will be characterised by a larger public sector as a result of the greater extent 
to which lower income voters use the fiscal system to coercively redistribute in their 
favour. Result 7 thus replicates analytically the empirical regularity documented in the 
work of Mueller and Stratmann (2003) that the size of government rises with political 
participation, assuming that such participation involves greater numbers of the poorer 
                                                          
12
 In the integrative model used here, the variance of incomes arises endogenously, rather than the GINI 
coefficient, even though the latter is a better measure of income inequality.  
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voters engaging in political activity. It is also consistent with the work of Husted and 
Kenny (1997) and Lott and Kenny (1999) on the effects of the extension of the franchise. 
 
Considering results 6 and 7 together suggests that empirical work, whether using cross-
section, time series or pooled data should include both a measure of the distribution of 
income as well as a measure of the covariance of influence and income (or political 
participation) in the same regression for the size of government. To our knowledge, such 
work has not yet been attempted.  
 
Finally, we turn to a complication in the analysis of comparative static results 6 and 7 that 
is not explicitly reflected in the present model. With the exception of the case where 
income and political influence are distributed independently, a change in income 
inequality within a country will also involve a change in σ2θY 13. Since the equilibrium 
size of government depends both on income inequality and on how income varies in 
relation to political influence, a change in the variance of income will thus affect the size 
of government through two routes: a direct route captured by result 6, and an indirect 
route operating through result 7.  
It is instructive to trace the full effect of a change in income inequality allowing for this 
complication. Assuming first σ2θY > 0, a mean preserving fall in σ2Y will decrease the size 
of government (the 'direct' effect, due to the connection between the variance of incomes 
and tax revenues). But, keeping political weights fixed, the fall in the variance implies 
that the covariance of incomes and influence decreases as influence and income is 
reshuffled among the same voters, leading to an 'indirect effect': at each level of influ-
ence, people find their interests have now changed and the parties will respond accord-
ingly by increasing government size.  
                                                          
13
 This can be seen from the relevant formulas for variance and covariance, σ2Y =(∑iYi2 /I)-⎯Y2 and 
σ2θY
 
=(∑iθiYi2/I)-(∑iθi/I)(∑iYi2/I), where the political weights remain constant as the distribution of Yi 
changes. It is probably best shown by using a simple numerical example. Let us suppose a three-voter 
economy, where the poor are more sensitive politically (this is the most complicated case). The 
incomes and respective political weights (Yi, θi) of the three voters are assumed to be (5, 0.5); (8, 0.3) 
and (14, 0.2). The corresponding income variance and income – influence covariance are σ2Y =14 and 
σ2θY= -8.05. Consider a mean preserving increase in the variance of income, so that the income – 
influence pairs become (4, 0.5); (8, 0.3) and (15, 0.2). It is easily checked that the resulting income 
variance and income – influence covariance become σ2Y =20.66 and σ2θY= -9.82, so that the mean 
preserving increase in the variance of income is followed by a fall in the covariance of income and 
influence. Since the political weights are endogenous they may also change as the distribution of 
income varies, so that the final effect on the covariance may differ from that suggested by the 
numerical example. The latter, nevertheless, does not negate the predicted change in σ2θY following the 
change in σ2Y. 
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Similarly, assuming a sufficiently negative covariance (σ2θY < -(α+β)γP2/I ), a mean 
preserving fall in σ2Y will increase the size of government via interaction with tax 
structure and revenue, and will also reduce the absolute value of the covariance of 
influence and income which tends to decrease the size of government in this case. These 
combined effects of a change in income inequality on the equilibrium size of government 
under the different assumptions are summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. The Effects of Income Inequality on the Size of Government 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Assume   σ2θY > 0  
Then as  σ2Y ↓ ⇒  ⇒ s*↓ (direct effect    – result 6) 
    ⇒ σ2θY↓ ⇒ s*↑ (indirect effect – result 7) 
________________________________________________________________________
Assume σ2θY < - (α+β)γP2/I< 0  
Then as  σ2Y ↓ ⇒  ⇒ s*↑ (direct effect    – result 6) 
    ⇒ |σ2θY|↓ ⇒ s*↓ (indirect effect – result 7) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In both cases the two effects oppose each other, and whether the final outcome will be an 
increase or decrease in the size of government becomes in practice an empirical issue14. 
The empirical consequences of the relationship between the distributions of income and 
of influence are not known. 
 
5.  Comparison with the Median Voter and Leviathan  
 
Since the present framework is one of multi-dimensional policy choices, the median voter 
theorem is not applicable. There are two ways around this problem if we want to do a 
comparative analysis of the models as a way of understanding how the integrative model 
differs from extant models in the literature.  
 
We can assume some sort of imposed separation of dimensions (e.g., due to the operation 
                                                          
14
 Basset, Burkett and Putterman (1999) have also considered these two effects informally in their 
empirical work. In terms of our model, their argument supposes a positive covariance between income 
and political influence and assumes that income equality increases. We can see from Table 1, that these 
assumptions imply that there are then two opposing factors in operation. 
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of legislative rules), and assume that there is a median income voter equilibrium in each 
policy dimension treated separately. Or, we can simplify the probabilistic voting model 
by assuming there is a single income tax rate and a single level of public expenditure, 
with the two related through the government budget constraint. In this case, the median 
voter theorem is also valid, and it seems reasonable then to compare the resulting 
equilibria. We proceed with the latter line of inquiry.  
 
With one tax rate, the budget constraint of the government is now 
 
CG   =  ∑i tYi ,   i=1,...,I .                                    (5') 
 
Here the tax rate t is also equal to the relative size of government; t = CG/ ∑Yi . In the 
probabilistic voting setting, the equilibrium can again be determined by maximizing 
S=∑iθiVi, subject to (5'). Working in a manner similar to the one described above, after 
the relevant manipulations, we obtain the simplified probabilistic voting equilibrium tax 
rate as 
 
                            γP⎯Y 
t*     =     __________________________________  ,       (13) 
     (α+β)γP2 + Iσ2θY⎯Y +⎯Y2 
 
where this time σ2θY is the covariance between θi and Yi. Thus the politically optimum 
income tax rate, and thus the relative size of public expenditure, depends positively on the 
consumer tastes for the public good, and negatively on the parameters of taste for leisure, 
the productivity in home production and the covariance between income and political 
power. The latter implies that in electorates where the rich have more political influence 
than the poor, the income tax rate will tend to be lower and vice versa. Here the effect of 
an increase in mean income is ambiguous, since sign (∂t*/∂⎯Y) = sign (γP[γ(α+β)P2 –⎯Y2). 
All these results are identical to those obtained from equation (12). However, in contrast 
to the multi-tax rate setting, in the present simplified case the equilibrium tax rate is 
independent of the variance of income σ2Y, since the latter cannot be as fully taken into 
account in the setting of a single rate.  
 
It is also interesting to note that it does not appear possible to establish whether the size of 
government will be higher when the tax system discriminates among taxpayers, or when 
there is a single flat rate, except when there is no correlation between influence and 
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income. Assuming that mean income is the same under the two versions of the probabilis-
tic model15, upon comparison of equations (12) and (13), we obtain that (where σ2θY is the 
covariance between θi, and Yi2 from equation (12)) 
 
sign {s*– t*} = sign {[(α+β)γP2 + I⎯Y[σ2θY(σ2Y +⎯Y2) -⎯Yσ2θY },  
 
which cannot be signed unambiguously. If income and influence are independent, then a 
situation with the more complex tax system will clearly lead to a larger public sector. But 
this sort of independence would be an unusual situation in advanced democratic societies. 
 
Now we derive the median voter analogue to (13). In a median voter context, the 
Condorcet winner maximises the utility function of the median voter VM, subject to the 
budget constraint (5'). In the present model, there is an one-to-one relationship between 
voter income and the tax rate that maximises utility: ti = γP⎯Y/[(α+β)γP2 +⎯YYi].  
 
If the median voter has median income, the median voter analogue to (13) is  
 
          γP⎯Y 
tM   =   ________________________          (14) 
   (α+β)γP2+⎯YYM 
 
This result can also be thought as a special case of the probabilistic voting equilibrium, 
where θΜ = 1 and θi = 0 for all i≠M, so that only the preferences of the median count in 
determining public policy, while those of all other voters are ignored. Note that the 
variance of income does not enter, but its skewness as represented by the ratio of mean to 
median income does. 
 
As before, the tax rate (14) and size of government depends positively on the taste for 
public goods, and negatively on the parameters of taste for leisure and the productivity in 
home production. On the other hand, contrary to (13), we obtain that the sign of 
(∂tM/∂⎯Y) = sign (γ2(α+β)P3), which is unambiguously positive, as is required for 
Wagner’s law. This is a standard median voter result, where an increase in mean income 
relative to a given median leads the decisive voter to choose an increase in taxation and 
public expenditure in order to coercively redistribute income in his or her favour.  
                                                          
15
 Actually solving out for the tax rates in each case is not possible here, since doing so involves 
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Assuming that mean income is the same under both the probabilistic – single tax rate 
equilibrium and the median voter equilibrium16, by comparing (13) and (14) we obtain 
that  
 
tM ≥ t*   when  γP⎯Y2[(⎯Y-YM )  + Iσ2θY]  ≥  0 . 
 
Since in practice the distribution of income is positively skewed,⎯Y>YM.  Thus the above 
expression implies that when the rich have more political influence than the poor, or 
when income and political influence are distributed independently of each other, that is, 
when σ2θY ≥ 0, the median voter equilibrium will result in a larger income tax rate, and 
correspondingly larger size of the public sector, than will the comparable probabilistic 
voting equilibrium constrained so that there is only one tax rate. The reason is that when 
the rich wield relatively more political influence, they protect their wealth by securing a 
lower tax rate and government size than would have prevailed if the preferences of the 
(poorer) median voter were decisive. Once again we see the difference between a model 
where one voter is decisive, and one where political influence is effectively spread more 
widely in the electorate.   
 
5.2  Comparison with Leviathan 
 
To complete the comparative analysis, we derive the equilibrium tax rates that would 
prevail under a Leviathan-type government and compare the equilibrium with that of the 
probabilistic voting model. A Leviathan government is defined as one which sets tax rates 
(one for each person) at the levels which maximise tax revenue, irrespective of voter 
demands for public expenditure. The government is only constrained by the efficiency 
cost of taxation which adversely affects the size of the tax base. Existence of a voting 
equilibrium is not an issue in this framework. 
 
If Leviathan is assumed to discriminate perfectly between different taxpayers and charge 
each one of them a different tax rate, its maximisation problem is formally expressed as 
choosing the ti values which maximise R = ∑i ti Yi . Differentiating tax revenue with 
                                                                                                                                                                      
solving polynomials of third degree.  
16
 The caveat of the previous footnote applies again. 
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respect to each tax rate, recalling that Yi is endogenous in ti, and assuming for conven-
ience that tax bases are independently determined, we obtain that for each i17 
 
     Yi 
tLi   = ___________                                                    (15) 
 (α+β)P 
 
Given the separability between private consumption and public goods in the utility 
function (1), the labour supply function is independent of γ, so that Leviathan tax rates are 
independent of consumer tastes for the public good. As a result, Leviathan, who is only 
interested in maximizing the tax revenue extracted, does not care about the provision of 
public goods.  
 
The relative size of Leviathan, sL = ∑itiYi/∑iYi ,  is:  
 
 σ2Y  +⎯Y2 
sL    = ______________                                (16) 
 (α+β)P⎯Y 
 
sL is increasing in mean preserving changes in income variance, but ambiguous in the 
level of mean income. Assuming again identical mean incomes for the probabilistic and 
Leviathan equilibrium, comparison of equations (12) and (16) yields 
 
Sign  (sL -  s* )  = sign {(σ2Y+⎯Y2)(Iσ2θY + σ2Y +⎯Y2)}  >  0 
 
which implies sensibly that the relative size of the public sector is larger under Leviathan 
than in a competitive political system.  
 
If a single flat tax rate is somehow imposed on Leviathan, as Buchanan and Congleton 
(2000) recently propose, its problem then is to choose the value of t which maximises R = 
t ∑iYi . After the relevant manipulations this problem yields 
 
          ⎯Y 
tL       =         _________                                             (17) 
        (α+β)P 
                                                          
17
 Note that Leviathan in the present setup will never operate on the backward bending part of any 
Laffer curve. 
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In this case, the size of government varies positively with the size of mean income and is 
independent of income inequality: when one rate is imposed, there is nothing that can be 
gained by playing on the fact that taxpayers' behaviour varies with the distribution of 
income and, as a result, tL < sL.  
 
Finally, comparing equations (13), (14) and (17), and assuming average income is the 
same across models, we see that tL > tM > t*. Since Leviathan always imposes a higher tax 
rate than will occur in either the median voter or the probabilistic voting models, and 
higher rates reduce income, the full equilibrium rates will be closer together than is 
implied  by a comparison at a common average income.  
 
Our comparative analysis of the different models is summarized in Figure 1. The figure 
presents an approximate comparison of the models, because equilibrium average income 
and the Laffer curve is assumed to be the same in each case, and because no allowance is 
made for the change in the covariance of income and influence when the variance of 
income changes. Assuming a positive covariance of income and political influence, an 
increase in its value decreases the equilibrium rate of taxation under probabilistic voting 
and the same change leaves the median and Leviathan equilibria unaffected, as shown in 
the Figure. The figure also illustrates the positive effect of an increase in the variance of 
income on the size of government in probabilistic and Leviathan models, while in the 
median voter model this variance plays no role.  
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this paper we investigate the interaction of 'demand', 'supply' and 'political influence' in 
determining the size of government, and draw out some of the implications of this 
integrative framework for the interpretation of extant analytical and empirical results.  
 
The analysis emphasizes that government growth is a more complex phenomenon than 
implied by any one of the accounts we have considered on its own. In the more general 
model, where a political equilibrium reflects a balancing of heterogeneous interests in the 
electorate, the relative size of the public sector depends on preferences for leisure and 
public goods, productivity in home production, mean income, income inequality 
(captured by the variance of the distribution of income) and of particular interest, political 
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inequality in relation to income inequality reflected here in the covariance of political 
influence and the square of income. In this world, it is not surprising that studies which 
make use of data from different political jurisdictions, and which do not control for all of 
these factors, reach various conclusions regarding Wagner’s law or the role of the 
distribution of income.   
 
In contrast to the median voter models in the Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) tradition, 
we generalise the effect of income inequality on government size (captured in median 
voter models by the median to mean income ratio), by showing the importance of the 
variance of the distribution of income as well as its skewness. The variance enters as a 
result of the interaction of 'demand', the structure of taxation and the size of total tax 
revenues. In comparison to supply-side formulations in existing empirical work, we 
explore a model that formalises the market – nonmarket structure of individual economic 
activity and the consequences of the latter for raising tax revenue. Here we see that home 
productivity and the preference for leisure play similar roles, raising questions about the 
interpretation of existing empirical results. In comparison to probabilistic models of fiscal 
systems, such as that of Hettich and Winer (1988, 1999), the present study extends this 
mode of inquiry to include coercive redistribution. This synthetic approach leads to the 
analysis of the interaction of the distributions of income and influence and the structure of 
taxation in determining the relative size of government.  
 
Even in the simple framework we have constructed, the size of government is a complex 
phenomenon, where several determinants that can be expected to vary across political 
jurisdictions or over time play important roles. While the existing literature on demand, 
supply and political influence has provided several insights concerning the size and 
growth of government, there appears to be ample room for additional empirical work 
accounting for the role of all of the factors underlying the growth of government that are 
identified here.  
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 Appendix:  The Progressivity of the Equilibrium Tax System 
 
To complete the analysis of the integrative model, we investigate the nature of equilib-
rium tax progressivity in this Appendix. Tax progressivity here differs from that in a 
median voter model at least because the tax system is of high dimension. It differs from 
that in a Leviathan framework because the distribution of political influence plays an 
important role along with the nature of taxable activities. 
  
The income tax system which emerges in the political equilibrium (10) is one in which 
marginal tax rates ti for each taxpayer i depend on the level of his or her earned income 
Yi. For each taxpayer the tax payment may be written as Ti = [ti*(Yi)]Yi, where ti*(Yi) is 
given by equation (10). The individual average tax rate then is ATR=ti*(Yi), and the 
marginal tax rate in equilibrium is MTR=2ti*(Yi). (To derive this last result, we use 
equation (10) and its derivative with respect to Yi.)  Hence for each taxpayer, the 
marginal rate exceeds the average rate, implying that the set of rates, viewed as an income 
tax system, is progressive. An interesting question is: how progressive? That is, how does 
the marginal rate for the system change with income? 
 
Define the progressivity of the marginal tax rate (PMTRi) as the rate of change of the 
marginal tax rate with respect to income, that is, PMTRi ≡ ∂[ti*(Yi)]/ ∂Yi. From equation 
(10) we obtain that (where for simplicity we divide by 2): 
 
  (α+β)γP2 + Iσ2θY + (σ2Y +⎯Y2)I (⎯θ - θi ) 
PMTRi    =    ______________________________________________________     .                 (A1) 
   [(α+β)γP2 + Iσ2θY + σ2Y  +⎯Y2] (α+β)P      
 
Other things being equal, the expression in (A1) reveals that the degree of progressivity 
of the marginal tax rate, for each individual, will vary with the pattern of the relation 
between the income of the taxpayer and his or her relative political weight.  
 
For situations in which θi  =⎯θ  for all i,  and hence where σ2θY  =  0, (A1) shows that there 
will be no marginal rate progressivity, though the marginal rate will still be greater than 
the average rate. This case is of special interest, because it indicates that marginal rate 
progressivity of some sort, possibly quite complicated in pattern, is to be expected in the 
present framework.  
 
Assuming influence rises with income (σ2θY >0 ), for taxpayers with political influence 
below the mean influence, that is for θi  ≤⎯θ,  it will be unambiguously that PMTRi > 0. 
For θi  > ⎯θ,  the degree of marginal rate progressivity will decline with income since 
∂PMTRi/∂(⎯θ - θi ) < 0. This is a situation that is more favourable to the rich, who use 
their influence accordingly and, in this case, income and marginal rate progressivity are 
inversely related and the pattern of tax rates is certainly complex. 
 
Suppose instead that the highest influence is possessed by the individual with the lowest 
income, and so on, implying that as Yi declines, θi rises, and so θi <⎯θ, for Yi  >⎯Y and 
σ2θY
 < 0. In equilibrium (A1) indicates that these circumstances generate marginal tax 
rates which are increasing in income. Thus we see again the importance of the covariance 
of influence and income in determining the structure of the fiscal system.  
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Figure 1. 
Comparison of Probabilistic Voting, Median Voter and Leviathan Equilibria,  
Assuming A Single Tax Instrument 
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  s*A: Probabilistic Voting equilibrium when the covariance between   
  income and political influence is σ2Α > 0.  s* is increasing in σ2Y   
 
 s*B: Probabilistic Voting equilibrium where the covariance between income and 
political influence is σ2Β > σ2Α > 0. s* is increasing in σ2Y 
 
  tM: Median Voter equilibrium tax rate. Only tM  is independent of σ2Y  
  
  sL: Leviathan equilibrium tax rate. sL is increasing in σ2Y   
 
 
Note:  All equilibrium tax rates have been drawn on the assumption that mean in-
come is the same under the three different models of political equilibrium.  
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